In June 2002, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty – a cornerstone of strategic stability for 30 years – will be dead. The
implications of President Bush’s decision to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM
Treaty and, in its wake, to deploy National Missile Defense (NMD) are not yet
fully understood.
Above all, the unilateral withdrawal is unwise. To
rely mainly on defensive measures (like NMD) against dangers related to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among so-called rogue states is
short-sighted. For each defensive move, any number of offensive steps are
prepared by other states in response. The Cold War may be over, but another
expensive arms race may yet see the light of day. As a result, it will be nearly
impossible to build a quasi-100%-safe missile defence system. In the absence of
such a standard, is it in the interests of the USA to deploy a missile defence
shield that is basically unreliable?
It might be if such deployment would strengthen
deterrence. This, however, is highly unlikely. Either so-called rogue states (or
rather the leaders of such regimes) are ‘rational’ and subject to deterrence, or
they are not. Leaders who will not be deterred and who want to hurt the USA for
ideological or religious reasons or out of pure revenge are still going to
launch their missiles even if they know that the USA believes its system to be
‘highly capable’ (say, 95% effectiveness with 95% probability). NMD will not
affect their deterrence calculations. Or, if it does, it may have an effect
opposite to that intended. In addition, while it may make sense to worry about
the existence of such leaders, it does not make sense for a democratically
elected government to maintain a defence policy that relies on nuclear
deterrence coupled with an ‘effective’ missile defence system that has never
been tested in real time. And with regard to those leaders subject to the
‘rational’ logic of deterrence – including probably all political leaders of the
existing ‘rogue’ regimes – what prevents the USA’s current nuclear (or even
conventional) weapons deterrent from doing the job?
Even in the unlikely event that NMD would slightly
enhance the deterrence threshold, the question is whether the whole project is
worth it, especially looking at its negative side-effects. There are serious
indications that the situation regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction might significantly worsen as a result of building NMD,
because the latter undermines the basic instrument aimed at preventing and
containing such proliferation.
The existing international non-proliferation regime,
hitherto recognized as the major obstacle to weapons proliferation, may unravel.
A key element of that regime, especially with regard to missiles and nuclear
weapons, was the ABM Treaty. Whatever its limitations, like all treaties it was
framed upon an extremely strong idea: in this case, limiting missile defence in
order to prevent strategic instability. Although the bipolar world structure has
evaporated, there remain strong regional powers with nuclear weapons in an
‘anarchic’ world in which tensions and conflicts are unavoidable. The basic
logic behind the ABM Treaty is therefore still valid, whatever its opponents may
claim. The unilateral withdrawal may lead to actions by Russia, China and other
states that in the end may result in increased proliferation, exactly the
opposite of what the USA wants.
China has always criticized NMD since its deployment
would easily neutralize China’s small intercontinental-range nuclear arsenal,
which consists nowadays of only 30 warheads. NMD degrades China’s deterrent to a
paper tiger. It is hard to believe that the Chinese will respond with no more
than a smile. After the bombardment of the Chinese embassy and the row over the
captured US spy-plane, this might be the last straw for the Chinese. Their
reaction, despite WTO membership, may not remain muted.
According to a US intelligence estimate of January
2002, China will quadruple its ICBMs aimed at the USA by 2015.1 The
Bush administration has stated that it is not troubled by this. The question,
however, is whether the 180 non-nuclear-weapon states that have signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) share this view. A buildup of the Chinese
arsenal might trigger a nuclear arms race in Asia, with India, Pakistan and
possibly Iran and Israel as falling dominoes. In the worst-case scenario, China
may export offensive and defensive technology to countries like Iraq and North
Korea. Bush’s decision may then have been counterproductive. China may even
shoot down satellites circling above its territory, as some Chinese strategists
have recommended. At the very least, China will continue to block UN
negotiations in Geneva about halting the production of nuclear fissile material,
although such an agreement is a litmus test for the non-nuclear-weapon states in
the framework of the next NPT Review Conference in 2005. (Or is the NPT, which
is four years older than the ABM Treaty, also outdated?) On top of this, China
will also be able to resume nuclear testing, which it can now easily justify.
But the Bush administration, which explicitly rejects the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, does not worry much about this either, as it may also provide the USA
with an opportunity to start testing. The Nuclear Posture Review, a declassified
version of which was released in January 2002, did not rule out testing in the
future and recommended shortening the time needed in order to be able to start
testing again.
The reaction of Russia is more difficult to predict.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is intelligent enough to see the whole picture
and not to worry too much about NMD. But what about the Russian military and
intelligence community? For many Russians who lived through the Cold War, the
ABM Treaty is a sacred cow. Whether Putin will be able to withstand the internal
pressure is hard to foresee. A worst-case scenario is not difficult to
imagine.
While it is true that this analysis may prove too
pessimistic, Bush is taking a big gamble. If relations among the larger powers
sour in the future – an eventuality which cannot be dismissed as unrealistic –
the international community will vainly look for arms control treaties to
function as a last resort in dark times.
This brings us to the underlying logic that may help
explain the US decision. The abolition of the ABM Treaty is symptomatic of the
Bush administration’s visceral antipathy towards arms control treaties as a
whole. In a last-minute move, a week before its decision on the ABM Treaty, the
USA also knocked down the protocol that would have been added to the Biological
Weapons Treaty. The fruit of seven years of negotiations, that protocol would
have complemented the treaty with verification mechanisms. Even the European
Union was critical of the US actions. Do other states first have to follow the
US example by withdrawing from arms control treaties before the US political
leadership understands the potential consequences of its unilateralist
policy?
The Bush administration considers international
treaties as such more as obstacles than as useful policy instruments. The
best-known example of this, of course, is the Kyoto Protocol, which tries to
deal with global warming in a coordinated and global way. A similar case is the
establishment of the International Criminal Court. Those who believed that 11
September might have ended US unilateralism are being proven wrong.
Dr Tom Sauer
Department of Politics
Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium
NOTE
1 Walter Pincus, ‘US Alters Estimate of Threats’, Washington
Post, 11 January 2002, p. A01.